Archive for September, 2007

Rapid Response was Crucial to Containing the 1918 Flu Pandemic

One of the persistent riddles of the deadly 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic is why it struck different cities with varying severity. Why were some municipalities such as St. Louis spared the fate of the hard-hit cities like Philadelphia when both implemented similar public health measures? What made the difference, according to two independent studies funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), was not only how but also how rapidly different cities responded. Cities where public health officials imposed multiple social containment measures within a few days after the first local cases were recorded cut peak weekly death rates by up to half compared with cities that waited just a few weeks to respond. Overall mortality was also lower in cities that implemented early interventions, but the effect was smaller. These conclusions—the results of systematic analyses of historical data to determine the effectiveness of public health measures in 1918—are described in two articles published online this week in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. “These important papers suggest that a primary lesson of the 1918 influenza pandemic is that it is critical to intervene early,” says Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., director of NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which funded one of the studies. “While researchers are working very hard to develop pandemic influenza vaccines and increase the speed with which they can be made, nonpharmaceutical interventions may buy valuable time at the beginning of a pandemic while a targeted vaccine is being produced.” The historical analyses are part of an ongoing effort called the Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study (MIDAS), which is supported by NIH’s National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS). Through MIDAS, researchers have developed computer models to examine how a future pandemic influenza virus might spread and what interventions could minimize the impact. “Although the MIDAS models can’t predict the exact spread of a potential influenza pandemic, they have all suggested that introducing public health measures soon after the first cases appear could greatly reduce the number of people who get sick,” says NIGMS Director Jeremy M. Berg, Ph.D. “The historical analyses help validate the models’ conclusion and their potential usefulness in preparing for a pandemic.” The ideal way to contain a potential influenza pandemic would be to vaccinate large numbers of people before they were exposed to an influenza virus strain that is easily transmitted from person to person. Developing such a vaccine in advance, however, is difficult because an influenza virus mutates as it replicates, and over time these mutations can alter the virus enough that older vaccines are no longer effective. With current technologies, it would take months to develop a new vaccine after the first cases of pandemic influenza appear. Nonpharmaceutical interventions may limit the spread of the virus by imposing restrictions on social gatherings where person-to-person transmission can occur. The first of the two historical studies, conducted by a team of researchers from NIAID, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Harvard School of Public Health, looked at 19 different public health measures that were implemented in 17 U.S. cities in the autumn of 1918. The second study, undertaken at Imperial College London, looked at 16 U.S. cities for which both the start and stop dates of interventions were available. Schools, theaters, churches and dance halls in cities across the country were closed. Kansas City banned weddings and funerals if more than 20 people were to be in attendance. New York mandated staggered shifts at factories to reduce rush hour commuter traffic. Seattle’s mayor ordered his constituents to wear face masks. The first study found a clear correlation between the number of interventions applied and the resulting peak death rate seen. Perhaps more importantly, both studies showed that while interventions effectively mitigated the transmission of influenza virus in 1918, a critical factor in how much death rates were reduced was how soon the measures were put in place. Officials in St. Louis introduced a broad series of public health measures to contain the flu within two days of the first reported cases. Philadelphia, New Orleans and Boston all used similar interventions, but they took longer to implement them, and as a result, peak mortality rates were higher. In the most extreme disparity, the peak mortality rate in St. Louis was only one-eighth that of Philadelphia, the worst-hit city in the survey. In contrast to St. Louis, Philadelphia imposed bans on public gatherings more than two weeks after the first infections were reported. City officials even allowed a city-wide parade to take place prior to imposing their bans. If St. Louis had waited another week or two, they might have fared the same as Philadelphia, says the lead author on the first study, Richard Hatchett, M.D., an associate director for emergency preparedness at NIAID. Despite the fact that these cities had dramatically different outcomes early on, all the cities in the survey ultimately experienced significant epidemics because, in the absence of an effective vaccine, the virus continued to spread or recurred as cities relaxed their restrictions. The second study also shows that the timing of when control measures were lifted played a major part. Cities that relaxed their restrictions after the peak of the pandemic passed often saw the re-emergence of infection and had to reintroduce restrictions, says Neil Ferguson, D.Phil., of Imperial College, London, the senior author on the second study. In their paper, Dr. Ferguson and his coauthor used mathematical models to reproduce the pattern of the 1918 pandemic in different cities. This allowed them to predict what would have happened if cities had changed the timing of interventions. In San Francisco, which they found to have the most effective measures, they estimate that deaths would have been 25 percent higher had city officials not implemented their interventions when they did. But had San Francisco left its controls in place continuously from September 1918 through May 1919, the analysis suggests, the city might have reduced deaths by more than 90 percent. The fact that the early, nonpharmaceutical interventions were effective at the height of the pandemic can inform pandemic planners today, the authors of both studies say. In particular, the two studies lend weight to guidance that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently released on the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions during a pandemic (http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/mitigation.html), which recommends precisely such a rapid early response.

Norepinephrine plus dobutamine versus epinephrine alone for management of septic shock: a randomised trial.

Lancet.  2007; 370(9588):676-84 

Annane D; Vignon P; Renault A; Bollaert PE; Charpentier C; Martin C; Troché G; Ricard JD; Nitenberg G; Papazian L; Azoulay E; Bellissant E;  
Raymond Poincaré Hospital (AP-HP), University of Versailles Saint Quentin, PRES UniverSud, Paris, France. djillali.annane@rpc.aphp.fr

BACKGROUND: International guidelines for management of septic shock recommend that dopamine or norepinephrine are preferable to epinephrine. However, no large comparative trial has yet been done. We aimed to compare the efficacy and safety of norepinephrine plus dobutamine (whenever needed) with those of epinephrine alone in septic shock. METHODS: This prospective, multicentre, randomised, double-blind study was done in 330 patients with septic shock admitted to one of 19 participating intensive care units in France. Participants were assigned to receive epinephrine (n=161) or norepinephrine plus dobutamine (n=169), which were titrated to maintain mean blood pressure at 70 mm Hg or more. The primary outcome was 28-day all-cause mortality. Analyses were by intention to treat. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00148278. FINDINGS: There were no patients lost to follow-up; one patient withdrew consent after 3 days. At day 28, there were 64 (40%) deaths in the epinephrine group and 58 (34%) deaths in the norepinephrine plus dobutamine group (p=0.31; relative risk 0.86, 95% CI 0.65-1.14). There was no significant difference between the two groups in mortality rates at discharge from intensive care (75 [47%] deaths vs 75 [44%] deaths, p=0.69), at hospital discharge (84 [52%] vs 82 [49%], p=0.51), and by day 90 (84 [52%] vs 85 [50%], p=0.73), time to haemodynamic success (log-rank p=0.67), time to vasopressor withdrawal (log-rank p=0.09), and time course of SOFA score. Rates of serious adverse events were also similar. INTERPRETATION: There is no evidence for a difference in efficacy and safety between epinephrine alone and norepinephrine plus dobutamine for the management of septic shock.

IV Lipid Emulsion as Antidote for Bupropion and Lamotrigine Overdoses

Reuters Health, 9/19/07:  Intravenous administration of lipid emulsion appears to be an effective strategy for managing an intentional overdose of bupropion (Wellbutrin) and lamotrigine (Lamictal), according to a case report described in the September issue of the Annals of Emergency Medicine.”Animal studies show efficacy of intravenous lipid emulsion in the treatment of severe cardiotoxicity associated with local anesthetics, clomipramine, and verapamil, possibly by trapping such lipophilic drugs in an expanded plasma lipid compartment (’lipid sink’),” Dr. Fred M. Henretig, of the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, and colleagues explain.

“Recent case reports describe lipid infusion for the successful treatment of refractory cardiac arrest caused by parenteral administration of local anesthetics,” they continue, “but clinical evidence has been lacking for lipid’s antidotal efficacy on toxicity caused by ingested medications.”

The investigators report the case of a 17-year-old female who was found unresponsive after intentionally ingesting up to 7.95 g of bupropion and 4 g of lamotrigine. Soon after transfer from the emergency department to the intensive care unit, the patient developed seizure activity and cardiovascular collapse. Advanced cardiopulmonary resuscitation, including 11 electrical defibrillation attempts, failed to restore sustained circulation.

A single 100-mL intravenous bolus of 20% lipid emulsion was administered 52 minutes into the second period of advanced cardiac life support. Approximately 1 minute later, a sustained pulse was observed, and sinus rhythm returned in the next 15 minutes.

The patient subsequently developed significant acute lung injury, but experienced rapid improvement in cardiovascular status and recovered. Near-normal neurologic function was observed on discharge after 24 days in the ICU.

“The patient had serial triglyceride, bupropion, and lamotrigine levels measured in serum saved from routine laboratory specimens drawn at the emergency department evaluation and three subsequent samples drawn during the course of her first hospital day,” Dr. Henretig and colleagues write. “The bupropion level was highest 77 minutes after lipid infusion and then decreased over time in parallel with the serum triglyceride level,” they note. “This relationship was not observed with lamotrigine.”

The team concludes that the temporal relationship of lipid administration to cardiovascular improvement “suggests a potential therapeutic benefit for this novel antidotal therapy.”

Ann Emerg Med 2007.

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Nothing satisfactory about patient satisfaction surveys

Ron Elfenbein, MD

I just bought a brand new car. As I was about to drive away, the dealer reminded me that I would be receiving a survey in the mail. He asked that I be sure to fill it out and send it back as his, “future depends on it”. I could not help but think of many of my colleagues who say the same thing to their patients upon their discharge.
Emergency medicine is the youngest specialty and we (and those before us) have fought long and hard to gain acceptance and legitimacy. We demand to be taken seriously, yet we have become beholden to outside forces that dictate our every move. How can we expect to be taken seriously, let alone take ourselves seriously, when we allow patient satisfaction (“patient sat”) surveys to tell us how well of a job we are doing? I am not implying that we shouldn’t care about what our patients think of us, but rather that our number one priority should be to provide good, honest, care and do the best, at all times, for all our patients. Hospital administrators place excessive stock in these scores, and to what end? I can see rationale for clinical outcome measures as we should always strive to improve upon our mortality and morbidity rates, but not only do patient sat surveys not improve care, they threaten to bring the system to its knees. Here’s how:
Problem #1:
You can’t please everyone
Let’s face it, sometimes EPs have to be the bad guys, and there’s no way around it. We have to tell the drug addicts that they won’t be getting any more Percocets. That’s not going to go over well. We have to tell the patient with the hangnail that he’s going to be waiting for hours, or worse, that he shouldn’t have come to the ED in the first place. He may be a bit frustrated. What happens when it becomes our priority to make these individuals happy? When we bend our knee to patient sat surveys we risk becoming beholden to drug addicts and serial abusers of the system.
Problem #2:
Don’t mess with triage

If you really want to improve your EDs patient sat numbers, you should focus your attentions on those patients who will actually receive a survey, right? The problem is that patients who are admitted, i.e. the sickest patients, don’t receive surveys; it is the less acute patient who gets one. Therefore, patient sat surveys put direct pressure on EPs to see the sickest patients last and the less acute first. Rather then educating the people who inappropriately utilize our services the surveys simply encourage them to keep coming back.
Problem #3:
Legitimizes system abusers

We have a national problem in the United States — ED overcrowding—due in no small part to individuals using the ED for primary care services, knowing that they won’t be turned away. Patient sat surveys send a clear message to these system abusers that the ED is here to serve them, in whatever capacity they choose. “Thank you for seeking care at our hospital,” we say, “we want to know what your experience was like in our ER for the toe pain you have had for six years. How were you treated? Was the waiting room nice? Was the triage staff appropriate? Please come back and see us again!”
Problem #4:
Salaries tied to surveys

I care about my patient sat survey scores because I am told to by my boss. More important, however, my bonus is directly tied to my patient sat scores. So now my salary is, to a great extent, being determined by drug addicts and other abusers of the system who know nothing of the quality of care I provide. All they know is that they spent four hours waiting to be seen only to have me tell them that their “cold” is indeed just that. They want their antibiotics and/or Percocets and, of course, are not happy they waited and left empty handed.
Problem #5:
Misspent funds

Hospitals are going bankrupt (see Prince George’s County hospital in Maryland) because of declining or non-existent reimbursements. And yet emergency rooms are bursting at the seams with individuals seeking routine care. And still, hospitals spend millions every year on patient sat surveys. Can these expenditures be validated with real results or are we just throwing money at the problem? I submit that patient sat scores tell us nothing of real use, and we ought to redirect these funds.
Problem #6:
Sat scores have become a game

What does it say about patient sat scores that emergency departments hire “Patient Sat experts” who teach physicians little tidbits to get their scores up. This entire scoring system has become a game. These consultants feed us lines to say, tell us to hold the patient’s hand, bring them a soda, a sandwich, and legitimize their complaints and those of their family. Basically, give the patient what they want, anything to get your scores up. Many EDs even pay people to make follow-up phone calls to raise their scores. When did patient satisfaction become so much like the scoring on American Idol?
It’s time for a change!
What gets my ire up are hospital administrators and their lobby groups. They are the first ones to stand up and complain about ED overcrowding, yet they directly encourage it by relying heavily on patient sat scores. You want to cure this problem? First, eliminate patient satisfaction surveys. Second, institute advanced triage. Put a nurse, PA, NP or EP in triage (depending on comfort level) to do a medical screening exam. I know we already triage, but we need to take it one step further. Those who are sick or potentially sick should be brought right back to the ED; those who are not should be educated! They should be told that the ED is happy to provide treatment, but that there is a co-pay, payable in advance. They should be provided with a list of alternative free clinics in the area for them to consider. By doing this, the overcrowding problem is fixed, EMTALA’s requirements are satisfied and the liability is not any worse than it is now (patients were screened, offered admission to the ED and given alternative, more appropriate venues at which to seek care).
All of that said, we cannot legitimately stand up and complain about any of this because we have sat back and watched it happen. Our complacency implicates all of us and we have thus lost the moral high ground. We are being encouraged to prescribe inappropriate medications, change the way we triage and treat patients, perform minimal to no real education and encourage people to keep coming back to the ED for their primary care. This, I am sorry to say, is the reality of modern, community emergency medicine. We should be ashamed of ourselves for allowing our profession to sink this low, for allowing administrators to dictate how we practice, how we prescribe and how we care for our patients. Mostly, we should be ashamed for what this has done to our emergency rooms in the guise of increased wait times, overcrowding, hospital closures and, according to every recent study on the subject, wholly inadequate preparation for any natural or man-made disaster. In short, we have failed the American people, and I for one am ashamed and embarrassed. We have no one to blame but ourselves. This was not what I signed up for when I entered the field of emergency medicine, I will tell you that.
I would argue that as the “front line” in the health care system, we have a greater responsibility to the population as a whole. If the politicians and hospital administrators will not fix this problem, we need to stand up, exercise some leadership and do so ourselves.
Ron Elfenbein, MD, physician activist and assistant director at Harbor Hospital in Baltimore, sounds off on how patient sat scores are bringing the emergency department to its knees. He recently campaigned to become a Maryland state delegate.
Emergency Physicians Monthly, September 2007